Optimizations and security in the CompCert verified compiler

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Proud owner of



- Genesys2 FPGA running dual Rocket (vivado-risc-v)
- Genesys2 FPGA running BOOM
- Nexys A7 FPGA
- HiFive Unmatched (quad SiFive U74)



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CompCert

Formally verified C compiler project led by Xavier Leroy, then at INRIA, now at Collège de France

Non-commercial https://github.com/AbsInt/CompCert Commercial https://www.absint.com/compcert/index.htm

trace of execution = sequence of external calls, volatile read/writes

```
valid trace of execution at C level \downarrow same trace of execution at assembly level
```



Use case: traceability



Safe-critical systems (e.g. fly-by-wire, protection systems...)

Obligation to match object code to source

Conventional method: -00 and some manual inspection

CompCert replaces this by mathematical proofs. Can **use optimization**.



Our own version



Chamois CompCert https://www.gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/certicompil/ Chamois-CompCert



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Semantics and proofs in CompCert

Each intermediate language comes with a semantics written in Coq.

Optimization / transformation phases written in Coq. (Can call external untrusted OCaml code.)

Must prove simulation for each phase



Simulation proofs

Lockstep

one step of program before the transformation \downarrow one matching step of program after the transformation

More complex simulations replace sequences of steps by sequences of steps.



A menu

1. oysters

- 2. veal blanquette
 - 2.1 prepare blanquette
 - 2.2 cook it

3. millefeuille

- 3.1 puff pastry
 - 3.1.1 fold 1, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.2 fold 2, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.3 fold 3, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.4 fold 4, wait 30 minutes
 - 3.1.5 fold 5
- 3.2 cream





"Official" CompCert produces instructions roughly in the source ordering. Not the best execution order in general! Especially on in-order cores.

Our solution: verified scheduling



Superblock scheduling

- 1. Partition each function into **superblocks**: one entry point, possibly several exit points, no cycle
- 2. Possibly do some other reorganization: tail duplication, etc. to get bigger superblocks
- 3. Schedule the superblock (no proof needed)
- 4. Witness through symbolic execution that the original and scheduled superblocks have equivalent **semantics** (proof needed)

Before register allocation, on IR, for ARM / AArch64 / KVX / RISC-V.

On Kalray KVX and AArch64: reschedule basic blocks on assembly instructions after register allocation, perform instruction fusion. (Work has began on **RISC-V**.)

Equivalent semantics

- Same order of exit branches in original and scheduled superblock
- All live pseudo registers and memory have the same value at same exit point (non-live registers can differ)
- Same (or smaller) list of instructions that may fail (division by zero, memory access) reached at same exit point

Obtained by **symbolic execution**: two registers are considered equal if computed by exactly the same symbolic terms



Example

 $r_1 := a * b$ $r_3 := a - b$ $r_3 := a - b$ $r_4 := a * b$ $r_2 := r_1 + c$ $r_2 := r_4 + c$ branch(a > 0, EXIT1)branch(a > 0, EXIT1)

 r_1 and r_4 are both dead at EXIT1 and at final point.

These two blocks are **equivalent**: in both cases $r_2 = (a * b) + c$ and $r_3 = a - b$



Acceptable refinement

 $r_1 := a * b$ $r_3 := a - b$ $r_2 := r_1 + c$ $r_5 := a/b$ branch(a > 0, EXIT1)

 r_5 dead on EXIT1.

On x86, the division may fail:

- it's allowed to move it beyond the branch
- the converse is not allowed

 $r_3 := a - b$ $r_4 := a * b$ $r_3 := r_4 + c$ branch(a > 0, EXIT1) $r_5 := a/b$



Information needed

For all instructions

- latency: clock cycles between consuming operands and producing the value (or, more generally, a timetable of when each operand is consumed after the instruction is issued)
- resource consumption: CPU units in use that preclude other instructions being scheduled at the same time

Very difficult to find even for "open cores"!!! (Reverse-engineer gcc and LLVM?)



Performance gain

CPU	Differences in cycles spent (%) compared to					
	no CSE3, no unroll			gcc -02		
			max	avg	min	max
Cortex-A53	-16	-63	+3	+10	-23	+87
Rocket	-10	-43	+1	+29	0	+184
Xeon	-21	-56	+4	+21	-3	+189
KV3	-11	-32	+3	+8	-13	+88



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Strength reduction

(paper accepted at OOPSLA 2023)

```
for(int i=0; i<n; i++) {
    r += t[i];
}</pre>
```

Naive compilation on RISC-V: t[i] means multiplication/shift, add, load. (Other architectures: solved by using a suitable addressing mode.)

Yet the address differs only by a constant offset across iterations!



Strength reduction

- Identify values that differ (add/subtract) by a constant across iteration.
- Rewrite multiplications...into addition by constant.
- Prove the transformation correct using glue invariants + symbolic execution + arithmetic rewrite rules.



Lazy code motion

Hoist loop-invariant code out of loops.

Proved by glue invariants + symbolic execution.



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Store motion

Hoist store operations out of loops.

Proved by glue invariants + symbolic execution.



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Example: complex sum-product

typedef struct { double re, im; } complex;

```
inline void sum_complex(complex *s, const complex *a, const complex 
double re = a->re + b->re;
double im = a->im + b->im;
s->re = re;
s->im = im;
}
```

```
inline void mul_complex(complex *s, const complex *a, const complex *
double re = a->re * b->re - a->im*b->im;
double im = a->re * b->im + a->im*b->re;
s->re = re;
s->im = im;
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```

Example: complex sum-product

```
void sumproduct_complex_array(complex *s, int n, complex *a, complex
complex r = {0., 0.}, p;
for(int i=0; i<n; i++) {
    mul_complex(&p, a+i, b+i);
    sum_complex(&r, &r, &p);
    }
    s->re = r.re;
    s->im = r.im;
}
```



Compiled complex sum-product main loop

.L102:

fld	f29, 0(x12)
fld	f12, 0(x13)
fld	f14, 8(x12)
fld	f11, 8(x13)
fmul.d	f30, f29, f12
fmul.d	f2, f14, f12
fmul.d	f28, f14, f11
fmul.d	f5, f29, f11
addi	x14, x14, 1
addi	x13, x13, 16
addi	x12, x12, 16
fsub.d	f3, f30, f28
fadd.d	f0, f5, f2
fadd.d	f4, f4, f3
fadd.d	f1, f1, f0
blt	x14, x5, .L102



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Security

(GOATCert? Hardened Chamois?)

- stack canaries on x86(-64), RISC-V, ARM, AArch64
- future: protection against hardware fault attacks by duplication of operations and tests? (PEPR Cybersecurité: Arsene)
- future: collaboration with special RISC-V hardware for hardware-supported software security? (PEPR Cybersecurité: Arsene)



Suggested instruction: conditional move

Wanted by companies that want predictable hard real time code (fewer execution paths)

Branches are **bad** for worst-case execution time static analysis (Absint aIT, etc.)

Suggestion: add **conditional moves for integer and floating-point registers** at least on in-order cores



Suggestion: dismissible loads

An operation that may fail cannot be moved before a branch $r_1 := a + i << 3$ branch(i > 3, EXIT1) $r_2 := load_s(p)$ $r_2 := load(p)$ branch(i > 3, EXIT1)

Cannot be done if the load can fail.

Need special load returning a default value instead of trapping.

- easy without virtual memory
- needs OS collaboration with virtual memory



Dismissible load on KVX

```
8 cycles
1100:
 compw.ge \$r32 = \$r4, \$r2
;;
 cb.wnez$r32? .L101
;;
 sxwd $r5 = $r4
 addw \ \$r4 = \ \$r4, 1
;;
 lws.xs $r3 = $r5[$r1]
;;
 addw \ \$r0 = \ \$r0, \ \$r3
 goto .L100
;;
```

6 cycles

```
.L100:
sxwd $r5 = $r4
compw.ge \$r32 = \$r4, \$r2
;;
 lws.s.xs $r3 = $r5[$r1]
;;
cb.wnez $r32? .L101
;;
 addw \ \$r0 = \ \$r0, \ \$r3
 addw \ r4 = r4, 1
 goto .L100
                                       renoble
```

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A general call for collaboration

Need collaboration between

- compiler writers
- architecture / core designers
- operating systems (low level)

Currently: CIFRE with Framatome

```
https://www.gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/certicompil/
Chamois-CompCert
```

Pre-pass scheduling: KVX; Cortex-A53/A35 (AArch64); Rocket, SweRV EH1, SiFive U74 (RISC-V); Cortex-R5 (ARM)

Post-pass scheduling: KVX; Cortex-A53/A35 (AArch64); in-progress for RISC-V