

brightside® your partner in security approval

brightside®




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partner
in security
approval



Physical Attacks on Cryptographic devices

How to break into today's
cryptographic hardware

Cryptography applied in IT systems



General secure banking system

financial institutions

bank **SCD**
computer

bank **SCD**
computer

bank **SCD**
computer

network service
providers

network
processor **SCD**

point of sale

EFT **SCD**
terminal

EFT **SCD**
terminal

EFT **SCD**
terminal

EFT **SCD**
terminal

Some general security viewpoints:

- ☐ 100% Security is never possible (everything can be broken)
- ☐ All design information is known or can be retrieved
- ☐ Breaking of one device may not lead to breaking of the entire system
- ☐ Weak aspects should be covered by other security measures
- ☐ Security has to be provided by the complete system

Secure Cryptographic Device

Security functions:


☐ Storage of sensitive data:

- ☐ Cryptographic keys
- ☐ PIN codes
- ☐ User data


☐ Examples:

- ☐ PIN Entry Devices (PED's)
- ☐ Host Security Modules (HSM's)
- ☐ Smart Cards
- ☐ Secure USB sticks
- ☐ Set-top boxes
- ☐ Trusted Platform Modules (TPM's) in phones, computers...
- ☐ FPGA configuration storage


Secure Cryptographic Device




Fraud detection




Penetration sensor



Penetration sensor




Epoxy resin




epoxy
resin

Freezing attack



Temperature sensor




Apply heat at appropriate locations



Removal of one-way screws via the front


Light sensor



Evaluation methods





Evaluation methods




Real-life bug examples


- ❑ Hardware bug fits in a PED for tapping magnetic stripe data




Smart card



Silicon wafer




What's inside a smart card ?





databus:
connection between
building blocks

General smart card attack methods



Hardware attacks on smart cards




Etching with fuming Nitric acid





Opening of chip enclosure

☐ 'Poor-mans' way




Result of etching process





Reverse engineering




ROM manufacturing

- ☐ Physical ROM design
 - ☐ physical transistors
 - ☐ metal mask ROM
 - ☐ ion implantation

- ☐ ROM code retrieval
 - ☐ reverse engineering of ROM decoders
 - ☐ image recognition of ROM cells
 - ☐ staining of ion implant ROM

Physical transistors



active
transistor

disabled
transistor


Metal mask ROM

active
transistor

disabled
transistors




Ion implantation



No visible
difference
between
cells



Ion implant ROM after chemical staining






Logical
one

Logical
zero


ROM code extraction




Mechanical probing



Scanning Electron Microscope




On-chip fuse (blown)



Voltage Contrast






Voltage Contrast: RAM contents




Focused Ion Beam modification


- ☐ Re-route logic
- ☐ Disable sensors (e.g. shield)
- ☐ Make probe pads
- ☐ Backside FIB edits



Examples of FIB modifications: circuit edit




Examples of FIB modifications: access lower layers



State-of-the-art in secure controllers

- ☐ Environmental sensors (active shields, light, clock frequency, voltage, glitch, temperature)
- ☐ Small feature size (~130nm) and 5-6 metal layers
- ☐ High complexity by using glue logic
- ☐ Internal encryption of bus and memory data
- ☐ Dedicated encryption hardware
- ☐ Hardware redundancy
- ☐ Countermeasures against perturbation and Side Channel Analysis
- ☐ Hardened software and resilient protocols

Physical shielding



Conclusions: Do we need physical security?

- ☐ Overall security is provided by a good combination of:
 - ☐ physical security measures
 - ☐ logical security measures
 - ☐ organizational security measures
- ☐ 100% security is never possible
- ☐ Secure Cryptographic Devices and smart cards are part of a system
- ☐ we need a secure *system* !

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